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National Security and the Amended 
Freedom of Information Act 
[I]t is clear to me that it is the Constitutional duty of the Execu- 
tive-as a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of 
law as the courts know law-through the promulgation and en- 
forcement of executive regulations, to protect the confidentiality 
necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of interna- 
tional relations and national defense.' 
But by the 1960s and 1970s the religion of secrecy had become 
an all-purpose means by which the American Presidency sought 
to dissemble its purposes, bury its mistakes, manipulate its citi- 
zens and maximize its power.2 
On November 21, 1974, Congress amended the Freedom of Infor- 
mation Act (FOIA) over the veto of President Ford.3 The provisions 
of the Amendments altering the status of national security information 
generated the greatest controversy and were a major cause of the Ford 
veto.5 The provisions require courts for the first time systematically 
to determine the substantive adequacy of executive classifications. 
This Note attempts to resolve some of the ambiguities of ? 552 (b) 
(1),6 the national security exemption of the amended FOIA. It then 
examines present classification standards to assess whether courts will 
in fact be able to exercise effective review of classification decisions. 
Finally, it evaluates the strengths and liabilities of the basic FOIA 
strategy of using the judiciary to review executive classifications. 
I. The (b)(1) Exemption of the Amended FOIA 
The Freedom of Information Act was originally enacted in 19667 
to replace ? 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act.8 Section 3 per- 
1. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
2. A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 345 (1973). 
3. 5 U.S.C. ? 552 (Supp. IV 1974). The Amendments became effective on February 19, 
1975. For a general discussion of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. ? 552 (1970), see Project, Government 
Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1022-163 (1975), and sources 
cited in id. at 1023-24 n.323, 1026 n.333; for a general discussion of the Amendments, see 
Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act: An 
Article in Honor of Fred Rodell, 84 YALE L.J. 741 (1975); Note, The Freedom of In for- 
mation Act Amendments of 1974: An Analysis, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 951 (1975). 
4. Clark, supra note 3, at 758. 
5. 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1318 (1974); Clark, supra note 3, at 754. 
6. 5 U.S.C. ? 552(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). 
7. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383. 
8. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, ? 3, 60 Stat. 238. 
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mitted the executive to withhold information to protect "any function 
of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest."9 The 
(b)(l) exemption of the original FOIA was drafted to limit the areas 
in which information could be withheld and to force the executive 
to be more specific in its reasons for withholding information.10 Un- 
like ? 3, the FOIA permitted information to be withheld only if 
"specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of the national defense or foreign policy."'" 
The Supreme Court in EPA v. Mink12 interpreted this exception 
to mean that if documents had in fact been classified by an execu- 
tive agency in a procedurally appropriate manner, the substantive 
adequacy of the classifications would not be subject to judicial re- 
view.13 The Court held that the Freedom of Information Act did 
not authorize or permit in camera inspections of contested documents 
to enable courts to separate the secret from the nonsecret and order 
disclosure of the latter.14 
The provisions affecting national security information in the Free- 
dom of Information Act Amendments were written specifically to 
overrule Mink.15 They were designed to empower courts to exercise 
"effective judicial review of executive branch classification decisions" 
in order to rectify the "widespread overclassification abuses in the use 
of classification stamps."16 The Amendments gave the courts discretion 
to examine documents in camera for a de novo determination of their 
classifications7 placed the burden of proof on the executive to sustain 
the classification,18 and authorized courts to separate "any reasonably 
9. Id. The APA also permitted "matters of official record" to be withheld "for good 
cause found." Id. ? 3(c). 
10. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965): 
Exemption No. 1 is for matters specifically required by Executive order to be kept 
secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy. The change of standard 
from "in the public interest" is made both to delimit more narrowly the exception 
and to give it a more precise definition. 
See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966). 
11. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54. 
12. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). For a discussion of the background of the case, scc Mink, 
The Cannikin Papers: A Case Study in Freedom of Information, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN 
POLICY 114 (T. Franck & E. Weisband eds. 1974). 
13. 410 U.S. at 84. Accord, Epstein v. Resort, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
398 U.S. 965 (1970). See Schaffer v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389, 390-91 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); 
Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 122 (D.D.C. 1975); Kruh v. General Servs. Admin., 
64 F.R.D. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
14. 410 U.S. at 84. 
15. H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974). 
16. 120 CONG REC. S9316 (daily cd. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). 
17. 5 U.S.C. ? 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). 
18. Id. 
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segregated portion of a record . . . after deletion of the portions 
which are exempt under this subsection."' Most importantly, the 
Amendments altered the nature of the (b)(l) exemption itself. Hence- 
forth documents can be withheld only if they are "(A) specifically au- 
thorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept 
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) 
are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.'20 
The Conference Report on the Amendments makes evident that 
courts will be expected to review both the procedural and substantive 
adequacy of executive classifications. Unfortunately, the language 
of the statute does not make clear the extent to which the phrase "in 
the interest of national defense or foreign policy" is meant to cir- 
cumscribe executive classification standards. Two interpretations pre- 
sent themselves. The phrase can be read to apply to the executive 
order authorizing classification procedures, in which case it would 
define the scope of an executive order which could be used as a de- 
fense to actions for disclosure under the FOIA. Interpreted in this 
manner, the phrase would prevent the executive from developing 
19. Id. ? 552(b). This power is particularly important because a frequent source of 
classification abuse has been the inclusion of admittedly nonsensitive material in clas- 
sified documents. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, EXECUTIVE CLASSIFICATION 
OF INFORMATION-SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING EXEMPTION (b)(l) OF THE 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 93-221, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; Comment, National Security and the Public's Right 
to Know: A New Role for the Courts Under the Freedom of Information Act, 123 U. P.k. 
L. REV. 1438, 1471 (1975). Section 4(A) of Executive Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339, 
343 (1974), 50 U.S.C. ? 401, at 3679 (Supp. IV 1974), presently requires that each clas- 
sified document shall 
to the extent practicable, be so marked as to indicate which portions are classified, 
at what level, and which portions are not classified in order to facilitate excerpting 
and other use. 
20. 5 U.S.C. ? 552(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). The language of the exemption was the re- 
sult of a compromise between the original House and Senate bills. H.R. REP. No. 93- 
1380, supra note 15, at 11-12; S. REP. No. 93-1200, supra note 15, at 11-12. The House 
bill (H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)) had allowed documents to be withheld if 
they were "authorized under the criteria established by an Executive order to be kept 
secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy." H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974). The Senate bill (S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)) had 
permitted documents to be withheld if they were "specifically required by an Executive 
order or statute to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy 
and are in fact covered by such order or statute." 
Although deleted by an amendment introduced by Senator Muskie on the Senate 
floor, S. 2543 originally contained a provision which stated: 
[U]nder the criteria established by a statute or Executive order referred to in sub- 
section (b)(1) of this section, the court shall sustain such withholding unless, follow- 
ing its in camera examination, it finds the withholding is without a reasonable 
basis under such criteria. 
120 CONG. REC. S9311 (daily ed. May 30, 1974). Even though not explicitly incorporated 
in the Amendments, this standard of "reasonableness" may be adopted implicitly by 
courts reviewing executive classifications, see pp. 414, 418 & note 68 infra. 
21. H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, supra note 15, at 11-12; S. REP. No. 93-1200, supra note 
15, at 11-12. 
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classification criteria for information clearly outside the area of na- 
tional defense or foreign policy. On the other hand, the phrase can 
be read to apply directly to particular information the executive de- 
sires withheld. Under this interpretation, courts would be required 
to examine the information withheld to determine whether it was 
both in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and in fact 
properly classified pursuant to the criteria of an appropriate executive 
order. 
The second alternative provides the courts with great range and 
flexibility in reviewing executive classification decisions. Courts would 
not have to decide the validity of an entire executive order, but could 
apply a standard which would operate independently of executive clas- 
sification criteria to determine if the pertinent information could be 
withheld under (b)(1). Consequently the discretion which the execu- 
tive presently enjoys in the development of classification criteria would 
be limited; in effect the executive would be forced to revise its cri- 
teria to be consistent with congressionally mandated standards. 
Although this interpretation of (b)(1) has much to recommend it, 
the legislative history of the Amendments does not support it. No 
one on the floor of the House or Senate suggested that the phrase 
"in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" was meant to 
imply an independent congressional standard by which the propriety 
of withholding specific information was to be measured.2 The Senate 
Report on the bill states explicitly that 
22. Discussion of the Amendments occurs at 120 CONG. REC. H1788-803 (daily cd. Mar. 
14, 1974), S9310-37 (daily ed. May 30, 1974), S17828-30, S17971-72 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1974), 
H10001-09 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974). Almost all congressional references to the (b)(l) ex- 
emption interpret it to mean simply that the courts would be able to determine if the 
criteria of the appropriate executive order had in fact been correctly applied to the 
information in question. Most typical are the comments of Representative Moorhead, 
chairman of the House subcommittee which produced the House version of the Amend- 
ments: 
[Mr. HORTON]. This provision is not intended to permit a court frce rein to 
classify information as it wishes, is it? 
Mr. MOORHEAD . ... [A] court could only determine whether the information 
was "properly classified pursuant to (an) Executive order." In other words, the judgc 
would have to decide whether the document met the criteria of the President's 
order for classification-not whether he himself would have classified the document 
in accordance with his own ideas of what should be kept secret. 
120 CONG. REC. H10007 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974). Also illustrative are the remarks of 
Representative Mink, one of the plaintiffs in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), p. 409 
supra: 
The change will empower courts to determine whether the matters meet the criteria 
established by the Executive order under which they were withheld. In effect courts 
will be able to rule on whether disclosure actually would bring about damage to 
the national security or on whatever other test is set forth in the Executive order 
as justification for the classification. 
120 CONG. REC. H1796 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1974). But see id. at H1797 (remarks of 
Rep. Gude). 
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Congress could leave ultimate classification decisions to the courts, 
under only a general national-defense or foreign-policy standard, 
but the committee prefers to rely on de novo judicial review un- 
der standards set out in Executive orders or statutes.23 
On the House Floor, Representative Erlenborn, ranking minority 
member of the House subcommittee which reported the bill, took 
the same position and indicated further that executive classification 
criteria need only be established in the general area of national de- 
fense or foreign policy.24 The legislative history of the new (b)(1) ex- 
emption thus indicates that courts are to apply the statutory standard 
to the executive order itself25 and to require merely that the order 
cover material which would affect national defense or foreign policy 
in a general way.26 
23. S. REP. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1974). See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, supra 
note 20, at 19. The reference to the "standards set out in Executive orders or statutes" 
tracks the language of S. 2543, supra note 20, Which permitted information to be with- 
held if "specifically required by an Executive order or statute to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact covered by such order or 
statute." The statutes referred to are those which, like 42 U.S.C. ? 2162 (1970) (Restricted 
Data), 18 U.S.C. ? 798 (1970) (Communications Information), and 50 U.S.C. ? 403(g) (1970) 
(Intelligence Sources and Methods), require certain kinds of information to be kept secret. 
The FOIA is not such a statute: 
Congress did not intend the exemptions in the FOIA to be used either to prohibit 
disclosure of information or to justify automatic withholding of information. Rather, 
they are only permnissive. They merely mark the outer limits of information that mlay 
be withheld where the agency makes a specific affirmative determination that the 
public interest and the specific circumstances presented dictate-as well as that the 
intent of the exemption relied on allows-that the information should be withheld. 
S. REP. No. 93-854, supra at 6. Thus the reference to "standards set out in Executive 
orders or statutes" cannot be read as an acknowledgment of an independent congressional 
"national defense or foreign policy" standard created by the FOIA. 
24. 120 CONG. REC. H1794 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1974): 
The coUrt would only review the [classified] material to see if it conformed with the 
[executive order classification] criteria. The description "in the interest of national 
defense or foreign policy" is descriptive of the area that the criteria have been 
established in but does not give the court the power to review the criteria. 
25. Supporting this interpretation is the function which the Supreme Court in EPA 
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), assigned to the phrase "in the interest of the national de- 
fense or foreign policy" in the unamcnded (b)(l) exemption. The Court interpreted the 
phrase as identifying the appropriate executive order authorizing classifications which 
would exempt information from disclosure under the FOIA. Id. at 82-84. See Robertson 
v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 255 
(1975). 
26. On March 10, 1972, President Nixon issued Executive Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 
339 (1974), 50 U.S.C. ? 401, at 3678 (Supp. IV 1974), which authorized the classification 
of information "in the interest of national defense or foreign relations of the United 
States (hereinafter collectively termed 'national security'). At the time many in 
Congress felt that the Order enlarged executive classification prerogatives beyond the 
limitations of the "national defense or foreign policy" limitations of the FOIA. E.g., 
Hearings on United States Government Informnatiou Policies and Practices-Security 
Classification Problemns Involving Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Inforination Act 
Before a Subcomtn. of the House Commel. on Governmttent Operatiotns, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess. pt. 7, at 2852-53 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (analysis of the Order by 
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If this interpretation of congressional intent is correct, the drafts- 
manship of the new (b)(1) exemption is inadequate. It contains no 
requirement that the criteria of an executive order be in fact in the 
interest of national defense or foreign policy27 and thus permits the 
executive to classify whatever information it wishes, so long as a 
proper authorization is issued.28 Neither the executive nor Congress 
the staff of the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, incor- 
porated into the remarks of Representative Moorhead, chairman of the House subcom- 
mittee which produced the House version of the 1974 FOIA Amendments). Particularly 
instructive in this regard is the following colloquy, id. at 2485, between Representative 
Moss, chairman of the House Subcommittee which considered the original 1967 Freedom 
of Information Act, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, William 
D. Blair, Jr., who helped draft Executive Order No. 11,652: 
[Mr. BlAIR]. [Njational security or national defense, whichever phrase you prefer, 
(toes in the modern world, involve things other than military. 
Surely what you had in mind in the relevant clauses of the legislation . . . was 
to indicate the committee's recognition or the Congress' recognition that our national 
security today depends on things like balance of payments, economic affairs, foreign 
assistance, things totally-- 
Mr. Moss. You are making an excellent case for exactly the reason why we de- 
cided not to use national security. . . . We decided to use defense and then go 
on directly to a specific field, foreign policy, not national security, because we were 
convinced that national security would be so broadly construed as to be a catchall 
for everything, that it was like having no qualifications of any kind. We felt that 
the foreign policy was definable because a country has a policy. It is enunciated from 
time to time by the President .... 
But policy was used, not relations, because we didn't want to go as broadly. 
For more of this discussion, see id. at 2473-74, 2484-93. For an argument that Executive 
Order No. 11,652 will not in fact alter the kinds of information actually classified, see 
Note, Reform in the Classification and Declassification of National Security Information: 
Nixon Executive Order 11,652, 59 Io0VA L. REV. 110, 120 (1973). 
Although Congress initially responded negatively to Executive Order No. 11,652, no- 
where in the legislative history of the amended (b)(1) exemption is it suggested that 
the phrase "in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" is meant to narrow 
the scope of the Order. On the contrary the phrase seems to have been given a meaning 
vague enough to encompass the "foreign relations' and "national security" language of 
the Order. See note 24 supra. Indeed, the amended (b)(1) exemption refers more ex- 
plicitly than the original (b)(1) exemption to an executive order establishing classifica- 
tion criteria, and at the time of the passage of the Amendments this was Executive Order 
No. 11,652. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367-68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
421 U.S. 992 (1975), interpreted the amended (b)(1) exemption to require the appli- 
cation of classification criteria of Executive Order No. 11,652. Pp. 417-18 infra. Schaffer 
v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), interpreted the unamended (b)(1) ex- 
emption similarly to require the application of Executive Order No. 11,652. See EPA v. 
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81, 84 n.10 (1973). 
27. 5 U.S.C. ? 552(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1974) permits documents to be withheld only 
if "specifically authorized . . . by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy." (Emphasis added.) The requirement of clause (b)(1)(B) 
that information be in fact properly classified refers only to the "procedural and sub- 
stantive criteria" of the appropriate executive order, H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, supra note 
15, at 11-12, and is not meant to require that the criteria or the information be in 
fact in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. 
28. The only case to interpret the new national security exemption since the Amend- 
ments became effective, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cent. 
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975), interpreted the exemption to mean that "any citizen now 
can compel the production of information actually classified if its classification was not 
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has so far offered this literal reading of the exemption, but the danger 
remains that the latitude of the statutory language may undermine 
the goal of effective judicial review of executive classification decisions. 
Although Congress intended to concede to the executive the power to 
create classification criteria within the general area of national defense 
and foreign policy, the precise language of the exemption may also 
concede to the executive the authority to decide when its criteria 
lie within this area. 
II. National Security and the Classification Standards 
of Executive Order No. 11,652 
A. Executive Order No. 11,652 
The major task facing courts under the amended (b)(l) exemption 
of the FOIA will be to determine whether withheld information meets 
classification criteria set out by the appropriate executive order. The 
standards presently defining classification practices are set forth in 
Executive Order No. 11,652, Classification and Declassification of Na- 
tional Security Material, issued by President Nixon on March 8, 
1972.29 If the plaintiff requesting classified information has no security 
clearance, courts must apply the lowest level of classification, "Con- 
fidential."30 According to the Order, documents should be classified 
"Confidential" if their "unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to cause damage to the national security."', 
authorized by the Executive Order." Id. at 1367. Aside from quoting the exemption itself, 
the decision makes no mention of any "national defense or foreign policy" standard, and 
it takes as relevant only the criteria set forth in Executive Order No. 11,652. Sece p. 417 
inifra. 
29. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), 50 U.S.C. ? 401, at 3678 (Supp. IV 1974). For a discussion 
of thlc Executive Order, see HOUSE REPORT, Stepra note 19, at 52-83; Project, supra note 3, 
at 973-93; Murphy, Knowledge is Power: Foreign Policy and lIforination In1terchangc 
Among Congress, the Executive, and the Public, 49 TUL. L. REV. 505, 515-31 (1975); Note, 
sutpra note 26; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 348-50; D. WVISE, THE POLITICS OF LYING: 
GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SECRECY, AND POWER 69-72, 109-10, 112 (1973). 
30. Exec. Order No. 11,652, ? 6(A), 3 C.F.R. 339, 346 (1974), 50 U.S.C. ? 401, at 
3680 (Supp. IV 1974); National Security Council Directive of May 17, 1972, ? VI(A)(I), 
5)0 U.S.C. ? 401, at 3682 (Supp. IV 1974). 
31. Exec. Order No. 11,652, ? 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1974), 50 U.S.C. ? 401, at 
3679 (Suipp. IV 1974). The Order creates three grades of classification, "Top Secret," 
"Secret," and "Confidential." The criterion for a "Secret" classification is that the un- 
authorized disclosure of the document "could reasonably be expected to cause serious 
damage to the national security." The Order offers four examples of such serious damage: 
[Djisruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security; sig- 
nificant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national sc- 
Culrity; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and com- 
promisc of significant scientific or technological dcevclopments relating to national 
security. 
The criterion for the "Top Secret" classification of a dlocument is that unauthorized 
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It has been argued that this standard is sufficiently precise for pur- 
poses of judicial review.32 However "national security" has long been 
recognized by courts and commentators as a notoriously ambiguous 
and ill-defined phrase.33 The Order provides no examples to illuminate 
the meaning of the "Confidential" standard.34 Although the standard 
need not be given a precise meaning to enable courts to overturn 
classifications which are manifestly erroneous5 closer cases will re- 
quire the development of judicial criteria to monitor the consistent 
application of this standard. The first challenge which the judiciary 
will face in the application of the "damage to the national security" 
criterion is thus to develop a definition of the phrase "national 
security."136 
disclosure "could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the 
national security"; five illustrations of the meaning of this criterion are listed. However, 
the Order offers no examples of the meaning of the "Confidential" classification criterion. 
For a discussion of the relationship between the "damage to the national security" 
standard of the Order and the "national defense or foreign policy" standard of the 
amended (b)(l) exemption, see note 26 supra. 
32. Comment, supra note 19, at 1464; Note, supra note 3, at 967. 
33. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 612 n.39, 613 n.42, 636 n.108, 656 
n.203 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3440 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976) 
(No. 75-1056); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (Black, J., 
concurring), 742 (Marshall, J., concurring) (1971); Ticon Corp. v. Emerson Radio & 
Phonograph Corp., 206 Misc. 721, 729, 134 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term, 
1954); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 309 n.8 (1972); Cole 
v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 542-43 (1956); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 64 (quoting 
statement of Rep. Moss that "national security [is] such an ill-defined phrase, that no 
one can give you a definition. . . . In 16 years of chairing the committee prior to Mr. 
Moorhead, I could never find anyone who could give me a definition"); A. Cox, THE 
MYTHS OF NATIONAL SECURITY: THE PERIL OF SECRET GOVERNMENT 5 (1975); Murphy, supra 
note 29, at 523. 
34. Note 31 supra. 
35. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1319 (4th Cir.) (Craven, J., concurring), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (courts should overturn those classifications which are 
"frivolous and . . . absurd") (dictum). 
36. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 11,652 purports to define the term "Inational 
security" as "national defense or foreign relations." Note 26 supra. This definition is in- 
adequate; the Order itself does not use the term consistently with this definition. For 
example, the Order applies the classification "Top Secret' to information the unauthorized 
disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage 
to the national security." It offers as an instance of "exceptionally grave damage" the 
"disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security." Substituting 
"national defense or foreign relations" for "national security," this example reads "dis- 
ruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national defense or foreign relations." 
Since the second use of "foreign relations" is redundant, "national defense" must he 
equated with "national security" if the original meaning is to be preserved. But this 
equation contradicts the stipulated definition. 
Testimony of Nixon administration officials concerning the meaning of national 
security in the Order suggests that the term is not meant to refer merely to national 
defense and foreign relations. See, e.g., the definition of national security offered by J. 
Fred Buzhardt, then General Counsel to the Department of Defense, p. 411 illfra; 
the colloquy between Representative Moss and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Blair, 
note 26 supra; and the testimony of Assistant Attorney General Ralph Erickson, Hearings, 
suipra note 26, at 2693, suggesting that national security as used in the Order may 
also encompass domestic security. 
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B. Impediments to Jtudicial Review under 
Executive Order No. 11,652 
1. The Meaning of "National Security" 
Although the use of the phrase national security extends back to 
the early days of the Republic,37 the term as we know it today emerged 
during the end of World War II and the beginnings of the Cold War."s 
Pearl Harbor had jolted the nation from, in the words of Walter 
Lippmann, her "unearned security,"39 and shocked it into an acute 
sense of its own vulnerability.40 This perception of vulnerability was 
reinforced by "the tremendously increased scope and tempo of modern 
warfare,"'4' by the development of offensive air weaponry4 and the 
atomic bomb,43 and by the growing enmity toward the Soviet Union.44 
National security emerged as the phrase that embodied the nation's 
strategy to meet these new threats.45 The keystone of this strategy 
was that the nation would be "potentially powerful"40 enough to fore- 
stall the possibility of any attack.47 With the global reach of the new 
37. Yale undergraduates in the early 1790's debated the question "Does the National 
Security depend on fostering Domestic Industries?" W. RoSTOw, How IT ALL BEGAN 
191 (1975). 
38. See D. Yergin, The Rise of the National Security State, Feb. 8, 1974 (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University) (on file with Yale Law Journal); F. EBERSTADT, 
UNIFICATION OF THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS AND POSTWAR ORGANIZATION FOR 
NATIONAL SECURITY: REPORT TO HON. JAMES FORRESTAL, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (Senate 
Comm. on Naval Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Comm. Print 1945) [hereinafter cited as 
UNIFICATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY]; A. Cox, supra note 33, at 1-31; Katzenbach, 
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Secrecy, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1, 4 (1973). 
39. W. LIPPMANN, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: SHIELD OF THE REPUBLIC 49 (1943). Prior to 
Pearl Harbor the nation's isolation in the Western Hemisphere had permitted the 
illusion that "a concern with the foundations of national security, with arms, with 
strategy, and with diplomacy, was beneath our dignity as idealists." Id. See A. WOLFERS, 
DISCORD AND COLLABORATION 151 n.6 (1962). 
40. Anderson, National Security in the Postwar World, 241 ANNALS 1 (1945). 
41. UNIFICATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 38, at 6. 
42. Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482 Before the Senate Comm. on Military Affairs, 
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1945) (testimony of Lt. Gen. J. H. Doolittle, Army Air Forces). 
43. UNIFICATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, stipra note 38, at 6. 
44. Katzenbach, supra note 38, at 4. 
45. E.g., Jacobs, The Issue Should Be Decided Now, 241 ANNALS 72 (1945). 
46. Anderson, supra note 40, at 7 (emphasis in original). 
47. UNIFICATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 38, at 6: 
The next war will probably break out with little or no warning and will almost 
immediately achieve its maximum tempo of violence and destruction.... 
The great need, therefore, is that we be prepared to defend ourselves always and 
all along the line, not simply to defend ourselves after an attack, but through all 
available political, military, and economic means to forestall such attack. The 
knowledge that we are so prepared and alert will in itself be a great influence 
for world peace. 
This concept of security offered a rationale to justify military expenditures in a newly 
peaceful world. See D. Yergin, supra note 38, at 355-56. 
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military technology, this strategy meant that "defense frontiers" would 
no longer be "our own coastlines" but instead "the entire world."48 
The power to forestall any potential attack meant more than military 
strength. National security implicated the entire resources of the na- 
tion-not only its intelligence apparatus, but its scientific, industrial, 
and economic capabilities.49 War was perceived ast a continual pos- 
sibility, and security could be maintained only if the nation were as 
alert in peace as in war.50 Moreover, since the goal of security was 
freedom from the very possibility of military assault, American policy- 
makers were led to express "a vital concern in the existence of an 
ordered world"5' and to attempt the elimination of political insta- 
bility and international discord. The most concrete implication of 
the new strategy of national security was thus the integration of foreign 
and military policies.52 In 1947 Congress created the National Security 
Council, whose function was "to advise the President with respect 
to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating 
to the national security."53 
The assumptions underlying the meaning of national security have 
remained intact since the postwar period.54 For example, in testimony 
48. Nimitz, Our Sea Power: Ships, Planes, Men and Bases, 12 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE 
DAY 39, 41 (1945). 
49. See, e.g., 1 BNA GOV'T LOYALTY & SECURITY 15:101 (1962) (definition of national 
security in sample regulations issued in 1953 by the Department of Justice in conjunction 
with Executive Order No. 10,450, Security Requirements for Governnment Employment, 
3 C.F.R. 57 (1974)); Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482 Before the Senate Comm. owl Military 
Affairs, supra note 42, at 108 (testimony of James Forrestal): 
[T]he question of national security is not merely a question of the Army and Navy. 
We have to take into account our whole potential for war, our mines, industry, 
manpower, research, and all the activities that go into normal civilian life. 
Cf. Hearings on S. 825 on Establishing a Research Board for National Security Before 
the Senate Commn. on Naval Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1945); Truman, National 
Security: Unified Direction of Land, Sea, and Air Forces, 12 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE 
DAY 168, 170 (1945). 
Concerned with the expansive meaning of national security, the Supreme Court held 
that in the Act of August 26, 1950, ch. 803, 64 Stat. 476 (later replaced by 5 U.S.C. ? 7532 
(1970)) (authorizing the heads of certain departments and agencies of the Government 
to suspend and dismiss civilian employees when deemed necessary "in the interest of 
the national security"), the term "national security" is used "in a definite and limited 
sense and relates only to those activities which are directly concerned with the Nation's 
safety, as distinguished from the general welfare." Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 543 (1956). 
50. Truman, supra note 49. 
51. Earle, The Threat to Amnerican Security, 30 YALE REVIEW 454, 476 (1941). 
52. Truman, sutpra note 49, at 170. See H. LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDI- 
VIDUAL FREEDOM 50-57 (1950). This perception was widely shared by the public. See, e.g., 
National Security: Science, "Conscription," Armny-Navy Merger-All Such Problenms Are 
Parts of One Whole, LIFE, Sept. 17, 1945, at 40. 
53. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. ? 402(a) (1970). The members of the 
Council were, among others, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De- 
fense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. 
54. See, e.g., Taylor, The Legitimate Claims of National Security, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
577, 592-94 (1974) (former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff calls for the creation 
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before Congress J. Fred Buzhardt, then General Counsel for the De- 
partment of Defense, offered the following definition of national se- 
curity in Executive Order No. 11,652: 
"[N]ational security" is a generic concept of broad connotations 
referring to the Military Establishment and the related activities of 
national preparedness including those diplomatic and internation- 
al political activities which are related to the discussion, avoidance 
or peaceful resolution of potential or existing international dif- 
ferences which could otherwise generate a military threat to the 
United States or its mutual security arrangements.55 
The contemporary conception of national security, rooted in postwar 
attitudes and events, thus depends both on a calculation of future 
contingencies and on an assessment of the priorities of the nation 
in foreign affairs. These characteristics raise serious impediments to 
effective judicial review of information withheld under Executive 
Order No. 11,652. 
2. Uncertainties and Intangibles in National 
Security Determinations 
National security is a prophylactic concept, concerned with poten- 
tial dangers-with "intangibles, uncertainties and probabilities rather 
than [with] concrete threats readily foreseeable and easily grasped."6 
Hence the "damage to the national security" standard is so intrinsically 
vague and elastic that courts will have difficulty applying it to execu- 
tive classification decisions. The question is not, as it is sometimes 
phrased, whether courts have enough technical expertise to assimilate 
the factual information necessary to conduct such a review,57 but 
of an "expanded National Security Council charged with dealing with all forms of se- 
curity threats, military and nonmilitary"; nonmilitary threats to security include the 
energy crisis, retarded economic growth, "higher costs of industrial production," "new 
deficits in international payments," "increased inflation," "the oil weapon," and the 
"population explosion"); B. BRODIE, WAR AND POLITICS 345-47 (1973). 
55. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 65 (quoting testimony before the House Sub- 
committee on Foreign Operations and Government Information). 
56. Schultze, The Economic Content of National Security Policy, 51 FOREICN AFFAIRS 
522, 530 (1973). See Office of the Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, 
The Legality of the United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 75 YALE L.J. 
1085, 1101 (1966) (legal justification for the Vietnam War, emphasizing the prophylactic 
nature of national security); Johnson, Special Message to the Congress oil tile State of 
the Nation's Defenses, in I PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, LYN - 
DON B. JOHNSON, 1965, at 62. 
57. E.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1063 (1972); Franck & Weisband, Dissemblement, Secrecy, and Executive Privilege, in 
SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 430 (T. Franck & E. WVcisband cds. 1974); Carrow, Gov- 
ernmnental Nonidisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 194 (1958); 
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whether the "damage to the national security" standard is specific 
enough to permit the use of this expertise even if available to the 
courts. 
3. Foreign Policy in National Security Determinations 
Although political rhetoric often invokes national security as if it 
were a "fact" beyond the control of policymakers,58 national security 
is dictated by policy rather than the reverse.59 It is not possible to 
supply national security with a content, military or otherwise, that is 
distinct from a political determination of foreign policy goals. 
In the first place, security is largely subjective;60 even in the absence 
of "objective" threats, a nation is not secure if it is afraid. Hence se- 
curity is not synonymous with power.6' Moreover, national security 
decisions require commitments of national resources which could be 
placed elsewhere; thus "acceptable" levels of security can only be 
determined by the balancing of security against other national priori- 
ties.62 Finally, national security can be achieved by other than purely 
military means. Switzerland seeks her security through a policy of neu- 
trality, while we seek ours largely through alliances and armaments.63 
Haydock, Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomnic Energy Security Requiremtents, 61 
HARV. L. REV. 468, 474 (1948); Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest 
and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1225 (1972); Comment, supra note 19, 
at 1469-72. But cf. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1972) 
(rejecting contention that the judiciary "would have neither the knowledge nor the 
techniques necessary" to decide whether to issue a warrant authorizing wiretapping in 
the interest of "national security in its domestic implications"). 
58. See, e.g., President Johnson's remarks: 
The world's most affluent society can surely afford to spend whatever must be 
spent for its freedom and security. We shall continue to maintain the military 
forces necessary for our security without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget 
ceilings. . . . 
So long as I am President, we shall spend whatever is necessary for the 
security of our people. 
Johnson, supra note 56, at 62, 69. 
59. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 613 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for 
cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3440 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976) (No. 75-1056); Nixon, Third An- 
nual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, RICHARD M. NIxoN, 1972, at 194, 304-08; Moore, Law 
and National Security, 51 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 408, 409 (1973). 
60. H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL 
INQUIRY 61 (1950). 
61. A. WOLFERS, supra note 39, at 150 n.5: "The fear of attack-security in the sub- 
jective sense-is . . . not proportionate to the relative power position of a nation." IM. 
at 151: "[S]ome may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in 
line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live 
with these same dangers." 
62. See, e.g., Nixon, supra note 59, at 304-05 ("we must harmonize our essential 
strategic objectives, our general defense posture, and our foreign policy requirements 
with the resources available to meet our security and domestic needs"); H. LASSWELL, 
sutpra note 52, at 55-56. 
63. A. WOLFERS, supra note 39, at 152-58. 
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Because national security essentially deals with a wide variety of vague, 
contingent circumstances, security decisions generally are not dictated 
by urgent military necessity, but instead are made at a time when 
a whole spectrum of military and diplomatic responses are possible. 
The dependence of national security on policy determinations creates 
difficulties for courts attempting to review executive classifications. 
Although courts will decide what is in form a factual question- 
whether disclosure of a. particular document would reasonably be ex- 
pected to damage the national security-that decision will turn on 
prior policy decisions. 
For example, if an FOIA plaintiff sought in 1967 to obtain the 
disclosure of documents revealing presidential dissimulation in the 
Gulf of Tonkin incident,64 a court would certainly have to accept 
the executive's factual claim that the release of such information would 
damage the Vietnam war effort. The real issue in the case would be 
whether, in light of this information, the court would accept the 
executive's prior policy determination that the Vietnam war was vital 
to our national security. If courts do not accept such executive policy 
judgments, they will have placed themselves in the position of inde- 
pendently evaluating foreign policy planning,65 a position they have 
always been reluctant to assume.66 But if courts accept at face value 
executive foreign policy judgments, they will have eliminated a major 
64. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 179. 
65. Professor Henkin has elaborated the difficulties which would be entailed in such 
an evaluation: 
If, on the one hand, the need for military secrecy in time of war seems obvious and 
paramount; if, on the other hand, as in the Pentagon Papers Case, many could not 
see why the Government should conceal documents several years old relating to all 
issue that had become of great national moment; who can meaningfully weigh the 
less obvious, less dramatic consequences of disclosure of any one of millions of 
documents that are the stuff of governing and of international relations How 
(toes a court weigh the effect on relations with country X, or on international re- 
lations generally, of publication of a diplomatic communication to or from another 
country which the latter does not wish to see public? 
Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon 
Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 279 (1971). The resolution of these "factual" questions 
rests on clearly political judgments. 
66. E.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 
(1948); Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) ("the 
question of what is desirable in the interest of national defense and foreign policy is 
not the sort of question that courts are designed to deal with"); Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 
F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd per curiamt, 510 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The 
realm of foreign relations is as inappropriate for judicial intervention as is the realm 
of national security"); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Sealx)rg, 463 
F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir.), application for injunction in aid of jurisdiction denied, 404 
U.S. 917 (1971); Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd on other 
grounds, 357 U.S. 144 (1958). For a general discussion of judicial reluctance to interfere 
with executive foreign policy determinations, scc Comment, supra note 19, at 1451-62; 
Project, supra note 3, at 1008. 
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element in that impartial review by which the sponsors of the FOIA 
amendments sought to check executive classification abuses.67 This 
deference would create a heavy presumption in favor of executive 
definitions of national security interests, although the amended FOIA 
requires that the burden of proof be placed on the executive to sus- 
tain its classifications.68 
Of course this presumption need not extend to the question whether 
the disclosure of particular documents will in fact "damage" the na- 
tional security interests as defined by the executive. But the power 
to define national security is in large measure the power to define the 
meaning of "damage." Moreover courts must resolve how "damage" 
is to be determined. On the one hand, any attempt to weigh the 
public's right to know against national security interests69 cannot be 
distinguished from the policy determinations which created the initial 
classification.70 On the other hand, if courts refuse to balance" and 
adopt a narrow, literal approach to the meaning of damage, the pro- 
67. "Government classifiers must be subject to some impartial review. If courts cannot 
have full latitude to conduct that review, no one can." 120 CONG. REC. S9319 (daily ed. 
May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). 
68. P. 402 supra. Congress clearly meant to place the burden of proof on the 
executive. The Senate defeated a proposal which would have sustained an executive 
classification unless it was "without a reasonable basis." See note 20 supra. It was argued 
that such a reasonableness standard would "make the independent judicial evaluation 
meaningless" and in effect shift the burden of proof to the FOIA plaintiff. 120 CONG. 
REC. S9319 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (statement of Sen. Muskie). President Ford vetoed 
the Amendments at least in part because of the lack of a "reasonableness" standard, 
and offered to sign the Amendments if they could be revised to include the requirement 
"that where classified documents are requested the courts . . would have to uphold 
the classification if there is a reasonable basis to support it." 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
Doc. 1318 (1974). Congress refused to budge in its rejection of the reasonableness standard 
and repassed the Amendments in their original form. 
It appears, then, that the criteria set forth in Executive Order No. 11,652 may ac- 
complish what a presidential veto could not. A judicial presumption in favor of 
executive definitions of national security in effect would deprive the FOIA plaintiff of 
the benefit of the amended FOIA's allocation of the burden of proof. 
69. Murphy, supra note 29, at 523, argues that damage should not ipso facto merit 
classification, but that potentialil damage to the defense or foreign relations of the 
United States should be weighed against the public's 'right to know' and the importance 
of a meaningful information flow to the democratic process." 
70. Classifications entail "a conscious determination that the governmental interest 
in secrecy outweighs a general policy of disclosure." Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 
509 F.2d 1362, 1366 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). Although courts may 
define the public interest in disclosure differently from the executive and hence reach a 
different outcome for a given classification, they cannot avoid reliance on executive 
definitions of policy and on executive characterizations of the need for secrecy. 
71. It is argued in Developments in the Law, supra note 57, at 1225-26, that where 
it is "clear both that the disclosure of classified information could prejudice the nation's 
defense interests and that there existed a strong public interest in knowing the infor- 
mation," courts should refrain from making what can only be political judgments. 
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phylactic quality of the concept of national security will tend to 
eviscerate the damage criterion altogether.72 
4. Other Impediments to Judicial Review 
The difficulties of effective judicial review of executive classifications 
are compounded by two additional factors. First, there is the danger 
of a confrontation between the executive and the judiciary,73 for the 
executive may claim inherent Article II powers to defy what might 
be interpreted as unwarranted judicial intrusion into the area of 
foreign and military affairs.74 The danger posed by such a claim is 
exacerbated under the FOIA. Unlike other actions in which- the Gov- 
ernment may be forced to choose between production of relevant ma- 
terial and dismissal of its case,75 in FOIA actions the production of 
information is the object of the suit. Courts will be especially cautious 
to avoid provoking such a direct confrontation.76 
Second, the common law evidentiary privilege accorded to state 
secrets77 will not aid courts in deciding whether disclosure of in- 
72. For example, consider the following news item: "President Ford told a Boston 
audience today that the domestic criticism of his cabinet shakeup [in which Defense 
Secretary James Schlesinger was dismissed] could harm the national security." Boston 
Evening Globe, Nov. 7, 1975, at 1, col. 4. It is certainly plausible that domestic criticism 
of Schlesinger's dismissal could affect Soviet perceptions of American defense priorities 
and in that sense "harm" the national security. But this contention relies on a very 
dilute sense of harm. The 'damage to the national security" criterion contains no in- 
trinsic standards measuring the extent of "damage" required for classification. Thus 
if courts were to use a strict test for damage and accept at face value executive defi- 
nitions of national security, they would have to withhold documents classified for no 
other reason than that their release would further exacerbate domestic criticism of 
Ford's removal of Schlesinger. Balancing the damage to the national security against 
the public's right to know is one way of raising the threshold of damage which must 
occur before courts will accept the validity of executive classifications. 
73. Davis, The Informnation Act: A Prelitminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 763-65 
(1967)); Project, supra note 3, at 1016. 
74. The executive, of course, has claimed such powers with respect to Congress. 
Hearings on S. 1125 Before the Subcornrn. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Covmm. 
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Brownell, Memnoranduin on Separation of 
Powers, 14 FED. BAR. J. 73 (1954); Rogers, Constitutional Law: The Papers of the Execul- 
tive Branch, 44 A.B.A.J. 941 (1958); R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (1974). 
75. Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 
66 YALE L.J. 477, 483 (1957); Welch, Classified Infornation and tile Courts, 31 FED. BAR 
J. 360, 368-70 (1972). 
76. The executive reportedly came close to such a direct confrontation with. the 
judiciary over production of tape recordings of presidential conversations subpoenaed in 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See N.Y. Times, July 25, 1974, at 22, col. 3. 
77. The state secrets privilege applies to "writings and information constituting mili- 
tary or diplomatic secrets of state." MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK -OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
? 107, at 230 (E. Cleary ed. 1972); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ?? 2378-79 U. McNaughton ed. 
1961). In contrast to information protected by the statutory (b)(1) exemption from suits 
under the FOIA, information protected by the state secrets doctrine is immune from 
production as evidence before and during trial. Use of the privilege "has been limited in 
this country." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). Courts determine the 
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formation would damage the national security. Courts have resolved 
claims of state secrets privilege by relying on conclusory phrases such 
as "military secrets," "strategic information," or "intelligence value" 
-phrases which could not be used to clarify the "damage to the na- 
tional security" standard.78 
These two impediments, together with the others considered above, 
compel the conclusion that courts will be unable to exercise effective 
review of executive classifications. The intrinsically vague, prophy- 
lactic, and policy-oriented nature of the concept of national security, 
the lack of clear standards of "damage," the delicate constitutional 
balance between the executive and the judiciary in the field of na- 
tional security, and the absence of useful common law doctrine, all 
combine to deprive courts of independent ground from which to chal- 
lenge executive decisions. Judicial review under the criteria of Execu- 
tive Order No. 11,652 will in all probability eliminate only those 
classifications which are manifestly erroneous. 
C. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby 
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. 
Colby79 is the only judicial interpretation of the (b)(1) exemption 
since the new FOIA amendments became effective in February, 1975. 
The opinion illustrates many of the impediments to judicial review 
under the amended exemption and Executive Order No. 11,652. 
Colby was a sequel to United States v. Alarchetti,80 a 1972 case in 
which Victor Marchetti, a former employee of the CIA, was enjoined 
from publicly disclosing classified information acquired by him dur- 
ing the course of his employment. In 1973, pursuant to the injunction, 
Marchetti submitted the manuscript of a proposed book to the CIA 
for clearance.8' When the CIA insisted that 168 items be deleted, 
application of the state secrets privilege by balancing the public and private interests 
in disclosure against the public interest in secrecy. Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 
50 MINN. L. REV. 875, 877 (1966); MCCORMICK, supra ? 107, at 230. In practice, the 
state secrets privilege cannot be used to withhold more information than could be with- 
held under the national security exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act, since 
any litigant desiring information from the Government for trial purposes can suic to 
obtain it directly under the Act. But cf. Theriault v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 637, 
641-42 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Project, supr a note 3, at 1021-22. 
78. Zagel, supra note 77, at 882, 884. 
79. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
80. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
81. Marchetti and his co-author, John Marks, were planning to publish The CIA 
asod the Cult of Intelligence. The injunction required Marchetti to submit to the CIA, for 
examination 30 days in advance of release, any manuscript relating to U.S. intelligence 
activities. United States v. Marchetti, Civil No. 179-72 (E.D. Va., May 24, 1972) (Permanent 
Injunction and Final Order). Marks and the publisher of the book, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
were co-plaintiffs in Colby. 
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Marchetti brought suit claiming that the items had not been in fact 
classified.82 
The district court upheld Marchetti's claims with respect to 142 
of the deleted items.83 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district court on this finding.'4 However, after oral argument but 
before the case was decided, Congress enacted the FOIA Amendments. 
Writing for the court, Judge Haynsworth chose to reach the addi- 
tional issue whether the deleted items could be withheld under the 
newly amended (b)(1) exemption.85 This issue required the court to 
decide whether classification of the deleted items was authorized by 
Executive Order No. 11,652. 
The Colby opinion did not consider several of the important issues 
raised by the amended (b)(1) exemption. It did not question whether 
the "national defense or foreign policy" standard of the statute func- 
tioned as an independent test for withholding classified material, or 
whether the "damage to the national security" criterion met this 
statutory standard.86 The court did not attempt to define the nature 
of national security interests: the case involved information connected 
82. Marchetti also claimed, and the district court found, that he had acquired in- 
formation relating to some of the items while not in the course of his employment. The 
court of appeals reversed the district court on this issue and remanded for reconsideration 
in light of a "substantial presumption" against such a claim. 509 F.2d at 1371. 
83. Since the Government could not produce the persons who actually classified the 
documents containing the deleted information and could not demonstrate that a clas- 
sification referred to all the contents of a classified document as distinguished from 
particular segments, the district court concluded that the specific deleted items had 
not been classified. 509 F.2d at 1365-67. 
84. The court held that the documents had been in fact classified because the "pre- 
sumption of regularity in the performance by a public official of his public duty" 
left "no room for speculation that information which the district court can recognize as 
proper for top secret classification was not classified at all by the official wvho placed 
the *Top Secret' legend on the document." Id. at 1368. It remanded to the district 
court for reconsideration using a burden of proof consistent with this presumption. 
Id. at 1370. 
85. Although neither Colby nor its predecessor, United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2(d 
1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), arose as FOIA actions, Judge Haynes- 
worth in his plurality opinion in Marclietti had taken a position similar to that of 
the Supreme Court in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), p. 402 supra, that courts 
should not review the substantive merits of executive classifications. 466 F.2d at 1317-18. 
(Compare Judge Craven's view, in his concurrence, id. at 1318-19, that courts should 
review the "reasonableness" of classifications.) Colby was decided on February 7, 1975, 
12 days before the amended (b)(1) became effective. The court evidently felt that it 
would serve no purpose to force the plaintiffs to sue once again under a standard which 
would permit judicial review of the substance of the classifications: 
[T]he Freedom of Information Act as now amended clearly provides for judicial 
review of questions of classifiability . . . . [T]hese plaintiffs should not be denied 
the right to publish information which any citizen could compel the CIA to 
produce . 
509 F.2d at 1367. 
86. See pp. 403-05 & note 26 supra. 
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with CIA intelligence operations which all parties apparently assumed 
was manifestly related to the national security. 
What is striking about the opinion, however, is its failure to con- 
sider whether the release of the deleted items in fact "could reasonably 
be expected to cause damage to the national security."87 The court 
avoided this question by relying on a standard of "classifiability." 
It concluded that "[i]t is enough . . . that the particular item of in- 
formation is classifiable and is shown to have been embodied in a 
classified document."88 The court examined "some, but not all"89 of 
the 142 deleted items, and found that "at least some of them" con- 
tained information related to intelligence operations and to scientific 
and technological developments "useful, if not vital" to national se- 
curity. It determined that these items "would seem clearly to be clas- 
sifiable" under Executive Order No. 11,652. The court also found that 
other items were classifiable because they "may relate to intelligence 
sources or methods."90 The case was remanded to the district court for 
reconsideration in light of "the additional element of classifiability."91 
The "classifiability" standard is curiously hypothetical, implying 
that information need only be capable of being classified, not that, in 
the words of the statute, it must be "in fact properly classified."92 The 
standard would appear to authorize the disclosure only of material 
which in principle could not reasonably be classified. It is therefore 
possible to argue that the standard is a covert reassertion of the "rea- 
sonableness" standard explicitly rejected by Congress.93 
87. Exec. Order No. 11,652 ? 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1974), 50 U.S.C. ? 401, at 3679 
(Supp. IV 1974). 
88. 509 F.2d at 1369. 
89. Not only did the court fail to examine all the deleted items, but it declined to 
order an in camera de novo review of the contents of the classified documents in which 
the deleted items appeared. The court defended its inaction by noting that the FOIA 
Amendments "[provide] the judge only with discretionary authority even to require 
production of the document for his in camera inspection; he may find the information 
both classified and classifiable on the basis of testimony or affidavits." Id. at 1369. The 
decision can derive support for this position from the Conference Report on the Amend- 
ments, which states that since executive agencies would have "unique insights" into the 
consequences of disclosure of classified material, 
the conferees expect that Federal courts in making de novo determinations in section 
552(b)(1) cases under the Freedom of Information law, will accord substantial 
weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the 
disputed record. 
H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, supra note 15, at 12; S. REP. No. 93-1200, supra note 15, at 12. 
However this caveat refers only to situations where de novo review is in fact undertaken, 
which was not the case in Colby, and it refers not to the classifiability of documents, 
but to the weight courts should give to executive representations of possible damage 
to the national security. 
90. 509 F.2d at 1368. 
91. Id. at 1370. 
92. 5 U.S.C. ? 552(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). 
93. See notes 20 & 68 supra. 
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The Colby opinion appears to recognize the inadequacy of the 
"classifiability" standard. In an important aside, the court referred 
the plaintiffs to the Interagency Classification Review Committee, a 
review board created by ? 7 of Executive Order No. 11,652 to su- 
pervise classification decisions. 
The members of the Review Committee, far more than any judge, 
have the background for making classification and declassification 
decisions. If, therefore, any of the items in dispute are thought to 
be properly declassifiable now, there appears to be an available 
administrative remedy which is far more effective than any the 
judiciary may provide, which can function without threat to the 
national security and which can act within the Executive's tra- 
ditional sphere of autonomy.94 
The opinion thus defers the substantive question of the declassification 
of the deleted items to the Interagency Classification Review Com- 
mittee.95 However Congress amended the (b)(1) exemption precisely 
to authorize courts to determine if withheld documents are properly 
classified pursuant to both procedural and substantive criteria of an 
appropriate executive order.90 The refusal of the Colby court to ac- 
cept this responsibility is a measure of the reluctance of the judiciary 
to enter the national security thicket. This refusal is particularly strik- 
ing when it is recalled that Colby was not at all concerned with 
the political judgments required to define national security, but 
only with the "factual" determination of the potential damage of in- 
formation disclosure. The deference to executive judgment in Colby 
is so complete that it creates serious doubts about the usefulness of 
the amended (b)(1) exemption. 
III. Courts and Executive Classification Abuses 
The inadequacies of the amended (b)(I) exemption call into ques- 
tion the basic FOIA policy of using judicial review to correct the 
"widespread overclassification abuses"97 which have by common con- 
sensus transformed the present classification scheme into an "extrava- 
94. 509 F.2d at 1370. 
95. Marchetti claimed that many of the classified items were already in the public 
domain. The court stated that the decision whether "information has been so widely 
circulated and is so generally believed to be true, that confirmation by one in a position 
to know would add nothing to its weight" should not be made by the judiciary but 
by the Interagency Classification Review Committee. "As long as it remains classified, 
however, there should be no further judicial inquiry." Id. at 1370-71. 
96. H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, supra note 15, at 12; S. REP. No. 93-1200, supra note 15, 
at 12. 
97. 120 CONG. REC. S9316 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). 
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gant and indefensible system of denial."98 Whether Congress can ever 
make this policy effective depends on the nature of the abuses it seeks 
to rectify. 
Classification abuses can be separated roughly into three categories. 
The first consists of those classifications which are, in one form or 
another, clearly erroneous-for example, classifications of nonsensitive 
information because of its inclusion in otherwise properly classified 
documents, classifications which have in the course of time become 
unjustifiable, or classifications which withhold information clearly not 
related to the area of national defense or foreign policy.99 This cate- 
gory of classification abuse can be effectively remedied by the amended 
FOIA. 
A second category of classification abuse is defined not by the ab- 
sence of a factual relationship between the disclosure of withheld 
information and potential damage to a policy, but rather by the ex- 
plicitly political judgment that the secrecy of the protected policy must 
itself be sacrificed due to competing interests in disclosure. Examples 
of this kind of abuse are classifications which are intended to conceal 
covert executive policies (e.g., the secret Cambodia bombings)'00 or 
to conceal mistakes, embarrassments, or wrongdoing the disclosure of 
which would clearly damage the national security. Information clas- 
sified for these reasons would continue to be withheld under present 
law, since such classifications meet the standards of Executive Order 
No. 11,652. Moreover, the correction of these forms of classification 
abuse can only be accomplished by an institution able to interfere 
deliberately with executive foreign policies. Courts would be most un- 
comfortable if required to perform this function"' and therefore it 
98. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 341. There is almost unanimous agreement on 
the existence of classification abuse. President Nixon stated that 
the system of classification which has evolved in the United States has failed to 
meet the standards of an open and democratic society, allowing too many papers to 
be classified for too long a time. The controls which have been imposed on clas- 
sification authority have proved unworkable, and classification has frequently served 
to conceal bureaucratic mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and ad- 
ministrations. 
8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 543 (1972). See, erg., HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERA- 
TIONS, AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (DEPART- 
MENT OF DEFENSE), H.R. REP. No. 1884, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1958); Hearings on 
United States Government Information Policies and Practices Before the Foreign Opera- 
tions and Government Information Subcomm. of the House Government Operations 
Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, at 97-101 (1971); HousE REPORT, supra note 19, at 40-49; 
D. WISE, supra note 29, at 55-87; Henkin, supra note 65, at 275; Katzenbach, supra note 
38, at 16; Parks, Secrecy in the Public Interest in Military Affairs, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
23, 23-24, 51-55 (1957); Note, Historical and Structural Limitations on Congressional 
Abilities to Make Foreign Policy, 50 B.U.L. REV. 51, 66-67 (Special Issue, Spring 1970). 
99. See p. 405 supra. 
100. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 357, 362. 
101. See note 66 supra. 
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would be preferable to have such decisions made by a political branch 
of government. 102 
Finally, there is a large residual category of abuse consisting of clas- 
sifications where it is questionable whether disclosure would damage 
the national security. These classifications may occur because of sys- 
tematic executive exaggerations of the justifiable scope of national 
security or of the possible damage to national security of unauthorized 
disclosure; they may also occur because of executive attempts to cover- 
up mistakes, embarrassments or wrongdoing which if disclosed would 
have uncertain effects on the national security. Under present law, the 
nature of the "damage to the national security" standard will in prac- 
tice impair the ability of courts to detect and disclose information 
withheld because of improper classifications of this kind. However 
Congress could assist courts in identifying and eliminating these abuses 
by adopting more specific criteria for classifications.103 
Congress can make classification criteria more specific in two dis- 
tinct ways. It can define more narrowly the substantive areas in which 
classifications may occur. For example, the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 creates a statutory scheme of classification for atomic energy in- 
formation.'04 A comprehensive system of classifications could be lim- 
ited to the areas of military plans, weapons systems, intelligence, and 
102. Two bills introduced in the 93d Congress attempt to correct these forms of 
classification abuse without resorting to the courts for at least an initial determination. 
H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), introduced by Representative Moorhead, would 
create a Classification Review Commission (CRC) whose members would be appointed by 
the President and confirmed by the Senate. The CRC would police the implementation 
of security classifications, rule on congressional requests for classified information, and 
investigate charges of improper classification. Decisions of the CRC would be appealable 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. For discussions of H.R. 12004, see 
Moorhead, Operation and Reformn of the Classification System in the United States, in 
SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY (T. Franck & E. Weisband eds. 1974); Hearings oni H.R. 
12004 Before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Sitbcomtmi. of the 
House Comm. on Govern ment Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Murphy, supra 
note 29, at 531-38. Senators Muskie and Javits introduced S. 3393, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 
which creates a Registrar of National Defense and Foreign Policy Information to supply 
a special Joint Congressional Committee on Governmental Secrecy with an index of all 
classified information. Only those documents listed on the index would be exempted 
from disclosure under the FOIA. The Joint Committee would review and revise the 
index. See Hearings on S. 1520, S. 1726, S. 2151, S. 2738, S. 3393, and S. 3399 Before 
tile Subcomm. On Intergovernnmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government 
Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); A. Cox, supra note 33, at 160-62. 
In the 94th Congress, H.R. 8591, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), has been introduced by 
Representative Steelman. H.R. 8591 charges the Comptroller General with the respon- 
sibility of monitoring executive classification procedures and with reporting semiannually 
to the Committees of Government Operations of the House and Senate. 
103. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973) ("Congress could certainly have provided 
that the Executive Branch adopt new [classification] procedures or it could have es- 
tablished its own procedures-subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privi- 
lege may be held to impose upon such congressional ordering.") 
104. 42 U.S.C. ? 2162 (1970). 
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secret diplomacy.105 The disadvantage of such restrictions is the im- 
possibility of foreseeing all future legitimate needs for secrecy. More- 
over, to specify a protected area does not imply any particular stan- 
dard to govern classifications within that area. For example, the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 authorizes declassification of atomic energy infor- 
mation which "can be published without undue risk to the common 
defense and security.'"106 Even though the protected area is quite spe- 
cific, the classification standard might be exceedingly vague. 
A second method of making classification criteria more specific is 
to require a closer relationship between the classification standard 
and the policies to be protected. One way to require this closer rela- 
tionship would be for Congress to permit classification of information 
only where necessary to protect a specific foreign policy or national 
defense objective.107 
Whether classification criteria are limited to particular areas or tied 
more closely to policy objectives, they necessarily depend on the 
policies they protect. It follows that in the area of national defense 
and foreign policy this dependence will create a presumption in favor 
of executive definitions of policy and executive characterizations of 
the possible harm from unauthorized disclosure. No congressional 
classification standards can in practice relieve the FOIA plaintiff of 
the burden of overcoming this presumption. 
105. This proposal has been put forward by A. Cox, supra note 33, at 63. H.R. 
8591, supra note 102, provides a more complete scheme of seven substantive areas in 
which classifications would be authorized. 
106. 42 U.S.C. ? 2162(a) (1970). 
107. Information may satisfy the requirements of Executive Order No. 11,652 without 
having been classified pursuant to a specific foreign policy or national defense objective. 
For example, publication of information revealing widespread private corruption among 
high State Department officials might vitally affect our foreign relations to the extent 
of damaging our national security, though the concealment of this corruption may not 
be related to a specific foreign policy or national defense objective. 
If Congress were to choose this method of requiring a closer relationship between 
classification standards and protected policies, the task would remain of defining when 
a foreign policy or defense objective is specific. 
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